Russia is Capitalizing on Economic Distress to Accrue Influence in Africa

Remonstrations in Kenya and Nigeria that spread, through protest and the ballot box, across Africa last summer exemplified the incremental political economy challenges facing African governments and their citizens from decades of rising debt. Russia is capitalizing on these developments to bolster security partnerships and geopolitical influence in Africa, with potential ramifications anathema to the interests of the United States and the global order.

Much has been written about the causes of Africa’s economic distress. Some point to Chinese “debt trap diplomacy” or to the debt sustainability of Chinese development finance over the past two decades, while others cite the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s Washington Consensus from Western-led institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Critics of the IMF and Western aid claim that IMF loan stipulations—including financial reforms, austerity, and adherence to governance standards—violate recipient countries’ sovereignty. Many African states are increasingly open to alternative sources of finance amid devalued currencies and rising costs of living.

In this environment, and with Cold War memories fading, Russia is carefully increasing its regional influence, salvaging some of the global power it lost after invading Ukraine, and positioning itself as an alternative to Western governments and institutions. By focusing on security over development, and using disinformation campaigns to gain popular favor, Russia caters to illiberal leaders interested in fortifying their political security.

Russia’s Growing Clout: Security and Public Appeal

Russia has been active in Africa for decades, especially during the Cold War. But Moscow has expanded its engagement in recent years by increasing diplomatic visits since 2022, waging disinformation campaigns across 16 African countries, and signing military cooperation agreements in 19 countries since 2014. Private military contractors linked to the Kremlin have increased operations across the continent, establishing a presence in Sudan in 2017, and since expanding to the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Libya, Mozambique, and Mali.

Ruling elites in Africa view Russia as an attractive partner because defense cooperation helps strengthen the stability of their regimes. Russia has already used military support and the deployment of irregular military groups to prop up authoritarian regimes in places like the Central African Republic, where the Wagner Group’s backing of the country’s president has coincided with an increase in human rights abuses.

Africa’s worsening debt crisis and economic hardship also provide Russia with opportunities to increase its financial engagement and gain support from African governments and publics. Russian overseas development assistance, though significantly lower than traditional Western donors both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, increased nearly twelve-fold from about $100 million in 2004 to $1.2 billion in 2017, including at least $47 million in social capital and energy development.

Moscow has also forgiven debts owed by some African countries and coupled relief with promises of energy resources and grain. This follows a trend among international lenders, as both the World Bank and the IMF have made efforts to forgive debt in recent years. Similarly, China has forgiven or restructured some loans and is shifting to smaller development projects offering less debt and more economic opportunities after earlier projects resulted in high debt exposure and public dissatisfaction.

There is some evidence that Russian forays in Africa have met public approval. Protestors have waved Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa, voicing perceptions of American and European “meddling” in domestic affairs and cheering non-Western alternatives. Russia appears to receive the greatest combined political and popular support in the Sahel, where its military interventions fill a security vacuum in states with rising terrorism and failed governance.

Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress through grain and fuel supply disruptions. Russian interests in Africa are also less significant than in regions with more geographically proximate strategic, economic, and political objectives.

Nevertheless, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. In the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent’s United Nations (UN) member states voted to condemn Russia. Voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Moscow remains.

Considering the Long Game

Future shocks generated by debt crises, demographic changes, and climate events will exacerbate economic and migratory difficulties across Africa. As the continent looks to address these challenges, Russia’s geopolitical, security, and misinformation influences are primed to pull African states away from U.S.-led institutions into Russia’s orbit. The Trump administration’s nationalist foreign policy may facilitate this process by prioritizing domestic over geopolitical affairs.

Further Russo-African alignment would have several drawbacks. It would allow Russia to adapt to sanctions with new markets and partners, continue to discourage democratization, and use security assistance to bolster dictators across Africa, furthering its own illiberal standing in the global order.

Russian disinformation in the region also entrenches China’s position by fostering skepticism of Western-led systems. This aligns African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan and its overseas market interests. For example, China is championing green energy development overseas—a strategy that not only meets African states’ demands for climate adaptation investment (hindered by the debt crisis), but also bolsters China’s domestic solar and electric vehicle industries.

Africa is a rising continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the West cedes opportunities to engage with a continent of green development potential and an increasingly educated workforce, it will undermine its own power and influence in the international order and global marketplace. Moscow is playing the long game while tacitly assisting China in their competition for support from a region of 1 billion people. Moscow and Beijing are adjusting to new geopolitical realities. The United States and its allies should, too.

William Decourt is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington studying political economy and transregional influence in the Global South. Spenser Warren is a postdoctoral fellow in technology and international security with IGCC in Washington, D.C.

A previous version of this op-ed was first published by Africa Is a Country on November 26, 2024.

Thumbnail credit: GovernmentZA (Flickr)