How Online Misinformation Paved the Way for America’s Pivot Away from Ukraine

Russia’s war in Ukraine is now stretching into its fourth year. Instead of celebrating Ukrainian resilience with a united front, the United States—under President Donald Trump—has shifted its stance, openly aligning itself with Russia. The White House has halted aid, conservative media now regularly amplifies Kremlin talking points, and American public opinion has turned sharply against supporting Ukraine’s fight for survival.

This shift didn’t happen overnight. It began in the war’s opening days, when partisan fault lines first emerged on social media.

In a study published this month in the journal Nature, my research team and I analyzed nearly 2 million posts by Americans about Ukraine on Twitter in February 2022, at the start of the Russian invasion and before Elon Musk bought the platform in April 2022. Our findings suggest that conservatives and liberals were having completely different conversations about the war from the very beginning.

Three years later, those divisions have hardened into policy. The right-wing information bubble that initially downplayed Russia’s aggression has now morphed into outright support for Putin. Although America’s pivot away from Ukraine appears sudden, partisan divisions evident on social media at the invasion’s outset reveal deeper, preexisting ideological fault lines. Conservative and liberal Americans reacted to the war in different ways, and social media likely amplified these divisions by reflecting and reinforcing misinformation and polarized discourse, helping set the stage for today’s sharply divided foreign policy.

The Ukraine War, Through Partisan Eyes

In February 2022, when Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, most American political leaders—from Joe Biden to Mitch McConnell—spoke with one voice. They denounced the invasion, praised Ukrainian resistance, and vowed to support Ukraine’s fight. The message was clear: America stood for democracy, and Putin had miscalculated in thinking we wouldn’t.

But outside of Washington, the unity was a mirage. Social media told a different story.

In the days after the war, liberals on Twitter were more likely than conservatives to profess support for Ukraine and liberal social media networks were awash with discussion of Trump’s first impeachment, which stemmed from his efforts to pressure Ukraine into helping his reelection campaign by digging up damaging information about his political rival, Joe Biden. Additionally, Trump’s consistent praise of Russian President Vladimir Putin—calling him a “genius” and expressing admiration for his leadership style—was seen by liberals as deference to an authoritarian adversary. The memory of Trump’s deference was fresh, and liberals saw the war as another chapter in the fight against authoritarianism.

Conservatives, by contrast, barely mentioned the impeachment. Conservative social media was instead consumed with conspiracy theories. Indeed, conservatives were more than twice as likely as liberals to spread misinformation about the war. Two prominent false narratives—both amplified by Russian disinformation—helped undermine conservative support for Ukraine. The first claimed the United States secretly funded labs making biological weapons in Ukraine, suggesting covert American wrongdoing. The second falsely asserted that Joe Biden, during his time as vice president, improperly pressured Ukraine to fire a prosecutor investigating corruption—a distortion of Biden’s role in a widely supported international anti-corruption campaign. These conspiracies fueled conservative distrust about the Biden administration’s true motives while also undermining trust in the Ukrainian government. It is not surprise, then, that social media would, over time, completely erode conservative willingness to back Ukraine against Russian aggression.

Admittedly, examining only five days of Twitter conversations at the start of the Ukraine war represents a limited snapshot of a complex issue. However, these initial days were uniquely significant, capturing the moment when public attitudes were forming and partisan positions were crystallizing. Given that almost three quarters of all Americans consume political news through social media, these early online discussions offered crucial insight into how ideological networks were interpreting—and shaping—responses to the invasion. In other words, this data provides an essential window into how social media discourse both revealed existing partisan divides and set the stage for the ideological battles that would later manifest clearly in public opinion and policy debates.

From Online Debate to National Policy

The partisan divide on Ukraine observed on Twitter reflected deeper, preexisting ideological divisions, but social media amplified and entrenched these differences by spreading misinformation among conservative networks. Over time, the persistent circulation of false narratives likely shaped conservative public opinion, ultimately influencing Republican policymakers to pivot away from supporting Ukraine.

According to polling by Pew, in March 2022, only 9 percent of Republicans thought the United States was sending too much aid to Ukraine. By November 2024, that number had risen sharply to 42 percent. This wasn’t due to any major change in Ukraine’s situation on the battlefield. So what changed? While our social media data alone can’t fully explain the shift, it suggests that misinformation circulating within right-wing online spaces likely reinforced and accelerated preexisting skepticism among conservatives, helping transform initial uncertainty into an openly pro-Russia stance within conservative media ecosystems.

Now, with Trump back in the White House, these attitudes have become official policy. Since taking office in January, Trump has dramatically shifted the United States’ stance toward Ukraine. Following a contentious meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the administration froze military aid, disrupted diplomatic relations, and effectively aligned U.S. policy more closely with Russian interests. Although the administration has ostensibly resumed aid, it has conditioned this support on Ukraine agreeing to a ceasefire—one that Russia has yet to accept—and a controversial mineral rights deal favorable to U.S. interests. Further compounding the issue, the president himself has echoed Kremlin rhetoric, blaming Ukraine for the war and questioning the legitimacy of Zelenskyy’s government.

None of this should be surprising. The foundation for this shift was laid online, where misinformation flourished unchecked and where ideological bubbles reinforced anti-Ukraine narratives long before they made their way into official policy.

The Polarization of American Foreign Policy

The Ukraine war is just one example of a broader transformation: American foreign policy is now as polarized as domestic politics.

The old idea that “politics stops at the water’s edge” has collapsed. The same partisan social media networks that shape attitudes on abortion, immigration, and vaccines now dictate how Americans think about war, alliances, and global conflicts. Ukraine was the first clear test of this trend. But it won’t be the last.

We’re already seeing similar ideological divides on U.S. policy toward Israel, China, and NATO. Given how much social media has accelerated these divides, it’s likely that the next major foreign crisis—whether it’s a conflict in Taiwan, Iran, or the Arctic—will be filtered through the same hyperpartisan lenses.

What Happens Next?

The Ukraine war has shown us that social media isn’t just a place where foreign policy is discussed—it’s a place where foreign policy is shaped. That should be a wake-up call.

For policymakers, it means recognizing that winning a foreign policy argument isn’t just about making the right strategic case. It’s about combating misinformation at its source. It’s about understanding how social media creates alternate realities for different ideological groups. It’s about crafting messages that can reach beyond the echo chambers that now define American discourse.

For the public, it means being more vigilant. It means recognizing that the ideological bubbles we inhabit don’t just influence how we talk to our networks online, but are actively shaping the policies undertaken by our leaders.

William Nomikos is an assistant professor of political science and director of the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project (DAPP) lab at UC Santa Barbara. He is the author of Local Peace, International Builders (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

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