Global and Regional Security Governance

University of California, San Diego
3 October 2002

Agenda
Participant List
Report
Download the report in .pdf format

Agenda

Chair: William Chandler, UC San Diego

Panelists:
James Sperling, University of Akron
Threat Perceptions, Capabilities, and Institutional Responses

Emil Kirchner, UC San Diego and University of Essex
The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence

Vladimir Ivanov, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia
Energy Security in Northeast Asia After the End of Cold War

Ellis Krauss, UC San Diego
Alliances and Economic Relationships: U.S.-Japan

Chair: Emil Kirchner, UC San Diego and University of Essex

Panelists:
Gaye Christoffersen, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey
Japan and the Formation of an Asian Energy Community

Song Xinning, Renmin University of China, Beijing
Security Threat Perceptions in China

Phil Roeder, UC San Diego, Political Science
Security Threat Perceptions in Russia

Paolo Foradori, University of Trento
Security Threat Perceptions in Italy

Alejandro Chanona, Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City
NORTHCOM and TIAR

Chair: Ron Bee, IGCC

Panelists:
Neal Beck, Political Science, UC San Diego
James Sperling, University of Akron
Riccardo Scartezzini, University of Trento, Italy
Luk van Langenhove, United Nations University, Bruges

Chair: William Chandler, UC San Diego

Panelists:
J. Lawrence Broz, UC San Diego, Political Science
William Paterson, ISG, Birmingham University., UK
Kristian Gleditsch, UC San Diego
Ron Bee, IGCC
Emil Kirchner, UC San Diego and University of Essex

Planning Committee

William Chandler
IGCC

Emil Kirchner
University of Essex

James Sperling
University of Akron

Participants

Ron BEE
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California

Lawrence BROZ
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California

William CHANDLER
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California

Alejandro CHANONA
Autonomous University of Mexico
Mexico City

Gaye CHRISTOFFERSEN
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Peter COWHEY
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California

Paolo FORADORI
University of Trento
Italy

Kristian GLEDITSCH
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego

Emil KIRCHNER
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego

Ellis KRAUSS
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies
University of California, San Diego

William PATERSON
Birmingham University
United Kingdom

Phil ROEDER
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego

Riccardo SCARTEZZINI
University of Trento
Italy

James SPERLING
Department of Political Science
University of Akron

Luk van LANGENHOVE
United Nations University
Belgium

Song XINNING
Renmin University of China
Beijing

Report on the Workshop on Global and Regional Security Governance

William M. Chandler and Emil Kirchner

I. The Context of Uncertain Security Threats

The Cold War principle of mutually assured destruction paradoxically provided predictability to East-West rivalry. Today, while the danger of global nuclear war has receded, the stable certainty of that era may have been lost. In the first decade of the post-Cold War period, non-state actors have surfaced prepared to use new forms of terrorism, directed at both military and civilian targets. We have also witnessed an unexpected outbreak of regional conflicts and have become increasingly aware of dangers emanating from so-called “rogue states,” whose leaders abide neither by international treaties nor by conventional forms of conflict resolution. The dispersion and availability of weapons of mass destruction have accentuated the severity of such dangers. The undoubted risk of nuclear proliferation has been complemented by horrific fears of biotechnology dangers (for example, anthrax, botulism, plague, and smallpox). Whether motivated by ideological or religious zealotry, state and non-state terrorists have demonstrated their preparedness to adopt inhumane strategies utilizing destructive technology that may have the potential to challenge traditional security architecture (Philip Stephens, “A world of fear and uncertainty,” Financial Times, 12/7/02).

September 11’s terrorist attacks underscored the need for achieving a new global system of security governance, but considerable obstacles to achieving such a system remain. These involve a) different threat assessments, b) divergent perceptions of security threats to states, and c) differing response preferences amongst major states ranging from unilateral action, to ad hoc coalitions, and to institutionalized multilateralism. Similarly, we observe variable inclinations toward “hard power” military options and “soft power” diplomatic or economic pressures in response to those security challenges (Nye 2000).

This project comparatively analyses the challenges of global and regional security governance and the changed security agendas. It considers the prospects for global and/or regional security governance by focusing on perceptions held by elites in the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and China. It further seeks to identify areas of divergent and convergent interests that may facilitate or inhibit international cooperation.

James Sperling opened the discussion by addressing both the contemporary security context and new challenges to managing global security governance. Two major challenges to security governance need to be assessed. First, policymakers must determine if long-standing Western security arrangements can be extended outwards. Second, policymakers must determine whether the new security system will be cooperative or competitive and whether it will be based on alliances or ad hoc balancing.

Two additional obstacles to constructing a new system of global security governance involve the heterogeneity of the international system and the lack of international norms. These two challenges beg the question of whether it is possible to come up with a system consistent both with norms of local countries and Western norms.

Sperling’s analysis also pointed to three additional questions that need to be answered by those dedicated to understanding global security governance: Does alliance theory still have relevance? What are the boundaries of the new security system? Finally, what role should existing international institutions play in a reconstructed security system?

All of these challenges must be considered given an uncertain post-Westphalian system where control of territory is no longer the only or most important priority. While in the past, most threats to states came from other states, non-state actors have begun to pose major threats in the minds of policymakers. Open economies and open societies have improved economic welfare but have also made the tasks of pursuing security more difficult.

Sperling further pointed to four “mechanisms of contagion” through which security threats may spread across borders. First, there is greater interaction density among states than ever before. Second, much of the world is characterized by flawed or underdeveloped civil society and political institutions. Third, the fall of the Soviet Union made much of Eurasia a problematic and uncertain region. Fourth, cyberspace now allows groups ways to link beyond state borders. Because these mechanisms of contagion pose new security threats, state actors will need to globalize their definitions of security.

Emil Kirchner addressed the problem of determining how security experts in the European Union (EU) and United States perceive security threats. He reported on a 1999 survey conducted with 42 security experts that is part of an ongoing project to analyze similarities and differences in EU and U.S. threat perceptions. Three meetings took place during the life of the project, in Brussels, London. and Washington. The survey addressed three related topics: the degree of probability of occurrence of twelve types of security threats; the suitability of institutions to deal with each of these threats, and the geographic origin of each of these threats. Kirchner explained how this survey documented a broad tendency among security experts to view multilateral modes of response, such as the EU and the NATO, as preferable to bilateral or unilateral means of response. Ethnic fractionalization and migratory pressures ranked highest as threats facing the North Atlantic area in 1999, with biological, chemical, and nuclear attacks seen as the least likely. The participants were also asked to project threat perceptions to 2010. In that case, while non-military threats were seen as still dominant, the threat of biological/chemical attack was also highly ranked.

Kirchner noted that this survey instrument also may provide an opportunity to determine if there is an epistemic community with similar views on security threats in the United States and Europe. The results indicate broad similarity between European and U.S. security experts in their perception of institutional response, but also point to some differences, for example, U.S. experts showed a slightly larger willingness to support a “national response.” Another difference was revealed in the question about the origin of threats, with U.S. security experts identifying fewer geographic areas as potential threats.

With regard to future studies, Kirchner suggested an extension of the survey to the G-8 countries as well as to China. The emphasis would remain on policymakers (relevant high-ranking government officials and parliamentarians). A major aim would still be to determine the degree of convergence or divergence between the European Union and the United States in threat perceptions. He further suggested that after September 11, 2001, we are likely to see a stronger U.S. preference for unilateral action.

Ellis Kraus presented an initial discussion of his collaborative project, “Managing the American Medusa: The Interdependence Dilemmas of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany.” He argued that while there has been substantial study of relations between the United States and each of these countries, there has been little comparison of these three most important alliances for the United States. Additionally, very few studies look at alliance relationships from the point of view of the alliance partners, and not just from the U.S. view.

Kraus noted that the project would seek to answer three main questions: What makes alliances and economic integration work? How do they work? Finally, what are the outcomes of those partnerships? The study will be conducted using a most similar/most different case design. Japan and Germany may be considered most similar to the extent that they are both very economically important to the United States and hold positions as regional economic anchors.

The post-Cold War world has shifted the way these alliances work. There have been three major factors leading to this shift: decolonization, de-bipolarization, and denationalization/globalization. Additionally, increasing interdependence in Europe provides new constraints and new opportunities for these alliances. Kraus discussed two additional questions the project seeks to answer. First, how do domestic institutions mediate between global and regional challenges? Second, how do the alliance partners themselves relate to each other? He noted that there has been a history of competition between the United Kingdom and Germany about who was the stronger ally of the United States.

II. National Experiences: Reports on Threat Perceptions

Vladimar Ivanov discussed the future of security in Northeast Asia, focusing on energy issues. He argued that the history of antagonism in Northeast Asia has particularly revolved around North Korea and the rise of China as a superpower. He identified two major issues for security policy in Northeast Asia. First, there exists no comprehensive security vision among elites. Second, there is a potential problem of response time to security threats that are of a non-military nature.

A potential problem in the region involves the relative lack of a clear vision of the security concerns of U.S. allies (including Russia, Japan, and the European states) on the part of U.S. security authorities. For example, when President Bush recently visited Russia, the new deal signed on an energy partnership between the United States and Russia included no discussion of Northeast Asia. This is problematic because while U.S. intentions with regard to expanding oil production in Russia are clear, U.S. allies in Northeast Asia have not yet adopted the same intentions.

There is a future energy crisis facing Japan. Over the next twenty years, the share of power in Japan supplied by natural gas will grow from 13 percent to 20 percent. The government, however, has committed to building twenty new nuclear power reactors, but this is not feasible. At the same time, Russia is likely to become the major producer of natural gas in the region. Ivanov discussed two important steps that must be taken to insure energy security for the future in Northeast Asia. First, it is essential that the United States, South Korea, China, and Japan pay close attention to the possibilities of supplying oil and natural gas. This collaboration is crucial. Second, “mega-projects” such as a trans-Siberian pipeline that are undertaken by Russia must be supported by the United States. Russia is not capable of undertaking them on its own.

Gaye Christoffersen also addressed energy security, focusing her discussion on the East Asian Energy Commission and on the politics of oil security in East Asia, rather than the economics of oil security.

Experts on energy policy in Japan believe Japan will not gain energy security until all of East Asia has energy security. However, there are four challenges to achieving this region-wide energy security. First, official Japanese energy policy must shift to become regional in focus. Second, China has to be convinced to think of energy security as a regional issue. Third, ASEAN has to be socialized into norms of thinking regionally and linked with Northeast Asia. Fourth, the United States has to be socialized to accept this vision as well. The United States cannot, however, be expected to support it. In fact, developing a regional energy security policy that works will require keeping the United States out of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) + 3.

Christoffersen argued that Americans have long predicted that a resource war between China and Japan would break out over scarce oil resources, although the Japanese reject American scenarios of future East Asian resource wars. U.S.–Japan differences on the nature of energy security and the pathways to energy security are related to their asymmetric security relationship and the question of whether or not Japan will expand its military role.

If the United States is capable of unilaterally achieving energy security, Japan’s energy security is embedded in regional security. For this reason, Japan must take the lead in providing non-traditional, comprehensive security in East Asia that includes oil security.

The regional body ASEAN + 3 is the right forum for the development of this security policy because it will allow Japan to play a stronger political role that it would in a forum such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that includes the United States. It will also allow China to play a stronger role. A significant barrier to the development of this policy is that China is not yet socialized into the norms that Japan is trying to promote with ASEAN+3. The idea of China’s energy security being linked to Japan’s security is widely held at the level of Chinese policy planners, but has not yet been adopted by policymakers.

Japanese policymakers believe that every state in East Asia should have a strategic oil reserve. South Korea has emulated Japanese policy almost exactly. However, China neither has a strategic oil reserve, nor is it clear who within China will develop one. Will it be the government or private companies?

The question of Chinese perceptions of security threats was directly addressed by Dr. Song Xinning (Renmin University of China). When discussing China’s perception of security threats, two basic elements need to be considered. First, China is a country undergoing a great transition from a planning economy to a market economy. Although the Chinese government always emphasizes the “socialist market economy” and “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” many Chinese believe that China is on the way to capitalism. Although it remains a capitalism lead by the Chinese Communist Party, change is also taking place through a process of leadership transition, as the older generation transfers political power into the hands of the younger generation. Second, Chinese national capabilities continue to mature. Although the party leadership always emphasizes that China is still a developing country, many Chinese believe that China is becoming a great power, especially an economic and political power. In consideration of these two basic elements, the Chinese perception of security threats is divided into two levels, domestic and international. .

The Chinese Communist Party is facing its own great legitimacy challenge. This was not a problem in the 1950s, 1960s, or even the 1970s. However, since the late 1980s, especially after 1989, the Communist Party has come to realize that there have been big problems. The only real source of its legitimacy is economic growth. This means that the Chinese leadership pays enormous attention to economic development.

Domestically, political stability is regarded as the pre-condition for economic development, and sustained economic growth is the guarantee of the Communist Party’s ruling power. Chinese foreign policy is designed to serve both domestic economic development and political stability.

At the international level, Chinese officials, as well as many scholars, focus their attention on the great powers. China took the “good neighborhood policy” as its priority in early and middle 1990s, but many have argued that there was no real security threat from neighboring countries, even from Russia and Japan. It s is the conclusion of many Chinese, that the only great power that can threaten China’s national security is the United States. If China maintains a good relationship with the United States, there will be no problem for China’s national security.

Since the late 1990s, and especially after September 11, some Chinese scholars began to rethink the threat to China’s national security. Their major argument was that China should change its way of thinking in four ways: First, although Chinese leaders still talk about multi-polarity, most Chinese have realized that too much attention may have been paid to the so-called multi-polar world. In the post-Cold War era, it no longer holds true and will not in the near future. The United States will be the only global hegemonic power for the decades to come, and China has neither the capacity nor the intention to challenge the U.S. position. Second, China should not pay too much attention to the contradictions among great powers. Traditional Chinese foreign strategy has been to find and use the conflicts among other world powers. Nowadays, the priority is to identify common interests instead of contradictions. Third, the only real traditional security threat to China comes from the United States, and the key issue that could lead to military confrontation is Taiwan. The Taiwan issue affects both domestic and international security. Domestically, it is a prime matter for the legitimacy of the CCP. Internationally, it contains the potential for endangering China’s national security. Fourth, since there is almost no traditional security threat to China and there is minimal possibility of China engaging in military conflict with other major powers, especially the United States, China should pay more attention to non-traditional security threats, including international terrorism, that could affect its economy, the energy sector, and food security. To do this, China needs to cooperate with the other major powers.

China will continue to make domestic security (economic development and political stability) its priority. In foreign affairs, China will do its best to cooperate with the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Japan.

In the discussion that followed, one participant suggested that the best way for China to deal with its security threats would be to democratize. Democratization would contribute to the internal legitimacy of the political system, would give China international legitimacy, and would be the only possible solution to the Taiwan situation. Song responded that democracy could in fact be problematic in China because of strong nationalist sentiment in the country. He suggested that Chinese backlash against the United States after events such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade could have been much worse if the country had been a democracy.

Security threat perceptions in Italy were presented by Paolo Foradori (University of Trento, Italy). Because of its history and its limited defense capabilities, Italy has always perceived its security threats through the lenses of its major allies and the international organizations of which it is a member. These include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and, more recently, the European Union.

Best classified as a small-medium power, Italy simply lacks the capacity to act alone. It is therefore bound to look at its external environment from a broad perspective that takes into consideration the views of its principal partners. In this respect, Italy’s perception of its security threats may be said to be somewhat distorted by the way its allies and partners look at the world's affairs. For instance, during the Cold War, Italian security policies were strongly conditioned by what NATO and the United States regarded as important. More recently, this tendency is evident vis-à-vis the European Union, through the forces of the phenomenon of “Europeanization,” whereby Italian national policies are largely affected by what is decided in Brussels. Italian foreign and security policies cannot be conceived apart from policies and threat perceptions as shared at the European level. To that extent, Italian national interests are often subordinated to larger European interests (for example, when Italy acquiesced to the will of its European partners to impose sanctions against Serbia, although it was originally not in favor of doing so).

This foreign policy based on deference to its allies has also meant that Italy had to worry less about security threats, since its security has always been guaranteed because of its membership in NATO. This has given Italy the luxury of focusing on internal security issues, such as criminality and international migration. In recent years, working to secure the rule of law against organized crime and terrorism has been high on the priority list of the state.

In posing the question, “Is there a place for Mexico in Homeland Defense?”, Alejandro Chanona discussed shifts in the way the United States now views security in North America, highlighting new security policies taken by the United States since the Quadrennial Defense Review conducted in 2001. After September 11 attacks, on April 17, 2002, the United States announced the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) as a part of the changes in the Unified Command Plan. On March 21, 2002, Mexico signed an agreement on Smart Borders with the US that entailed 22 specific actions.

NORTHCOM and Smart Borders are necessarily linked, given the fact that the United States is reorganizing its national security policies. The new National Security doctrine aims to get rid of the heavy burden of nuclear deterrence and to shift all single efforts to “Homeland defense.” That task is driving the force toward what the United States has defined as the “new war,” that is to say, the war on terrorism. The concept of “smart borders” is now a major point of negotiation between the United States and its two neighbors. A smart borders agenda has four pillars: 1) to secure the flow of people across borders; 2) to secure the flow of goods; 3) to secure infrastructure; and 4) to coordinate and share information in the enforcement of these objectives between countries.

Within the context of the war on terrorism, Canada and Mexico have become key partners in this new enterprise. Both belong geographically to the NORTHCOM area of operation, both countries share borders with the United States, and both will need to participate in the Smart Borders project.

In Mexico, only the Senate can authorize Mexican troops to move abroad. The Executive, the Mexican Congress, and the military have expressed themselves in relation to the new U.S. National Security doctrine. Their response so far has been to decline to participate in joint forces in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, Mexico will try to keep the peace by intensifying its organization of Smart Borders to insure that it honors its interest to support its neighbor, as well as maintaining internal stability and a minimum agreement among the political forces in the country. Smart Borders will address common threats to mutually reinforce public and economic security.

National security constitutes one of the most delicate issues between President Fox, and the military, and between Fox and the opposition parties. Sooner rather than later, Canada, Mexico, and the United States will need to construct a cooperative security strategy, designed to move the region towards a Security and Defense Identity. However, this is difficult to define. Even in , with supranational institutions and the political will for a Common Security and Defense Policy, such an identity does not yet exist.

It is also relevant that Mexico decided to withdraw from the Rio Treaty. This action was taken despite these new regional security trends. Mexico withdrew from the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in order to have greater maneuvering room in regard to its own National Security doctrine. Mexico will host the Conference on Security in the Americas in the year 2003, where it will advocate an open concept of regional security. It will advocate security in terms of civil security, as well as the related security problems of poverty and development.

III. Methodology

1. Conceptualization and definition of key concepts,
2. Defining the target group, in this case national elites,
3. Maximization of the quality of responses, and
4. Assuring cross-national validity.

Conceptualization

Kristian Gleditsch stressed the utility of clarifying terms analytically for the design and interpretation of the survey. The concept of security can be defined in quite different ways, ranging from relatively restrictive definitions building on military defense (for example, security from war and conquest) to more inclusive definitions of security that consider a wider range of threats against human life. Attempts to define security more comprehensively have argued for including political security (for example, security from extreme political oppression and persecution), economic security (for example, security from hunger and deprivation), social and cultural security (for example, cultural survival and minority rights), and environmental security for example, security from environmental degradation and disasters).

Obviously, many issues other than war, such as the full-scale effects of global warming, may lead to greater losses of life than minor military disputes. It is less clear, however, whether efforts to broaden the concept of security will be analytically useful or particularly helpful for practical action. An overly broad definition of security would encompass any alleged threat and, in the long run, render the term useless. Although 40,000 people are killed every year on U.S. highways, few would see a “war on traffic” as an effective way of protecting life and human security.

The debate over definitions of security is relevant to an elite survey since many definitions of security are highly normatively laden, and may be posed in such a way that it would be difficult to publicly express disagreement with them without appearing to be immoral. Clearly, nobody wants to be branded “not concerned about the environment.” Many efforts to include issues such as the environment in definitions of security are explicitly intended to raise issues from “low politics” to “high politics.” Similarly, indicating something as a “security issue” may be a way of saying that these issues are important, without necessarily translating into action or the ranking of policy priorities. This again raises problems with sincerity of responses and how they should be interpreted. In light of this, it would be helpful to include a series of alternative definitions of security in the questionnaire and try to elicit responses about what characteristics make respondent consider issues pertinent to security.

Different security challenges call for alternative solutions. Since different elites face different environments and may rank threats differently, differences between states need not reflect fundamental disagreements between elites but simply differences in threats between states. Rather than looking for preferences over institutions in general, it would be valuable to ask respondents about what type of security institutions (national, regional, international) they believe would be appropriate for a couple of particular challenges, and whether any existing arrangements could be emulated to address the particular challenge. This would give a better basis for making comparisons between states and across different contexts.

Luc van Langenhove saw the choice of threats (to be included in the survey) as essential. Responses to threats must be included as possible threats themselves. Indeed, in some cases the response to, for instance, a local conflict may carry risks to greater security threats at a more global level. In order to understand why threat perceptions vary across time and culture, he suggests adding a set of items that would allow correlation analysis. One could think of including items on how the respondents perceive the “general climate” that surrounds a threat or even values and beliefs about society and human nature. Also, one could include a set of “objective” indicators related to human security.

He also reminded the workshop of the significance of security regionalism, This implies that the regional level opens up new ways of solving conflicts. The typology presented at the conference presents a much broader view on security and includes so-called new threats. The question is what place is there for security regionalism in this context. To the extent that most of the threats are not limited to local places and that cross-border spillovers are possible, regional responses seem logical. But to what extent are regional responses perceived as feasible or possible? All regional institutions enhance their legitimacy by how well they respond to citizens’ expectations regarding security. A recent Euro-Barometer study showed that 87 percent of EU citizens consider that fighting crime should be a priority for action by the European Union.

The questionnaire should be standardized based on three principal questions (or dependent variables):

• Typology of threats: agencies/actors, how important, probability of occurrence, geographic origin.
• Capabilities: policy instruments, degree of capabilities, type of action.
• Institutions: attitudes towards ESDP, NATO, budget.

Targeting the Actors

A second essential concern is the identification of the appropriate targets of the survey that is, national parliamentarians serving on committees responsible for security and foreign policy; comparable ministerial personnel responsible for different aspects of security policies, policy-level civil servants, and comparable informal elites.

The survey will permit comparative analysis across nine countries (the G8 plus China), based on a quasi-experimental model. Each national sample will target some 150–180 people divided into six categories:

1. Members of the national Parliament. They will be identified and divided according to those belonging to the majority/opposition, and functional roles within Foreign, Defense, and Domestic ministries.
2. Leaders of political parties, divided by affiliation and institutional roles.
3. Civil servants. Diplomats, experts, and advisers in the ministries concerned with defense and security matters.
4. Armed forces, divided by ranks and in accordance with the different arms.
5. Economic/financial establishment, may distinguish entrepreneurs and top managers both within and outside in the military.
6. Civil society elites, may comprise media opinion-makers, academic-intellectuals, and religious authorities.

A pilot questionnaire will target two people for each country.

Langenhove added to this in noting, with direct reference to the draft research-proposal, that because the project intends to study perceptions of “elites” (he preferred to speak of “actors” or “stakeholders”), whom to include in the survey must be defined precisely. Also, it may be interesting and useful to compare the perceptions of politicians/policymakers with public opinion in general.

Quality of Responses

Lawrence Broz pointed to the necessity of assuring the sincerity of respondents to survey questions. As with any survey, the analyst must be sensitive to problems that arise when people act strategically in giving responses. People do this for a number of reasons. They may feel compelled to advance their organization's interest and thereby offer nothing more than the “official position” on an issue. If we seek the personal perceptions of individual elites, then we need to provide enough insulation to respondents to ensure they will freely speak their mind. Respondents may also try to anticipate the purposes of the research project and use their answers as a way to influence survey results. This kind of strategic response is very serious but particularly hard to deal with. If all or many of the respondents respond strategically, results will almost certainly be biased.

He also identified the “observational equivalence” problem. If questions require respondents to rank-order a number of international security threats, problems can arise if the threats are not completely independent of one another, or if they are impossible to distinguish observationally. If some respondents perceive threats as interdependent (for example, poverty and ignorance cause terrorism) they may rank them differently than if the threats are seen as unrelated. Surveys should thus be designed to allow respondents to express their beliefs about cause and effect. Similarly, if different threats result in outcomes that are observationally equivalent, then the results of a survey may not be particularly useful. Take, for instance, the issue of how to respond to “rogue states.” A policy of compliance by a powerful state (the United States) has to be credible to influence the behavior of the target (Schelling). Such a state would thereby announce intentions to take costly actions (such as a unilateral attack) even if it means undermining formal multilateral or regional security arrangements, the cohesion of alliances, or the norms of international behavior. Indeed, a threat is credible only if it imposes costs on the actor who fails to keep it. Thus a credible compellent (or deterrent) strategy and a breakdown in institutionalized multilateral cooperation may be observationally equivalent.

Riccardo Scartezzini recommended qualitative interviews of 24–30 cases chosen from among those targeted by the general survey This would provide in-depth assessment of the issues mentioned in the questionnaire. They should include people available to share information on the opinions and issues discussed in their respective environments.

He noted that to maximize the return rate, it is crucial to prepare a list of possible substitutions (with similar characteristics to the sample) in order to limit the number of failed answers. He further suggested an incentive strategy (official letters, meeting with secretarial personnel, informative feed-back, participation and discussion about the research’s findings) .

Assuring Validity: Problems of Cross-national Comparisons

Neal Beck observed that in comparing responses to a cross-national questionnaire where respondents in different countries may interpret the questions differently, one could use the method of providing vignettes to aid comparison of answers across nations. The method is described in a series of World Health Organization working papers (accessed at http://gking.harvard.edu/vign/).

For analyzing questionnaires to elites in the various countries, one can do better than either simply assuming all elites everywhere are similar or all differ (by country). With a Bayesian hierarchical analysis, one can allow elites to vary by country, but not vary “too much.” (This is also known as multilevel analysis.)

One can also take advantage of modern tree-based and other cluster/graphical methods to analyze the elite responses and see if they seem to show some structure. In particular, do the responses cohere in a small number of dimensions (rather than analyzing results as if each question represents a different dimension)? One also might want to pursue various strategies related to Guttmann scaling, that is, does an answer to a “harder” security issue indicate what a respondent did with an “easier” one (where “harder” and “easier” are defined in the context of the study). Such an analysis might be done via “Mokken scaling.”

Finally, colleagues who have sound expertise with designing and performing cross-cultural surveys should be involved in the project. As well, for understanding changing security threats, the project should include qualitative methods to complement the quantitative surveys.

IV. Concluding Comments

Bringing the workshop to a close, Ron Bee (IGCC) summarized much of the security discussion, “At a time when the war on terrorism is underway with some fifteen NATO allies engaged in Afghanistan, covert and overt operations taking place in many other countries, and a conflict with Iraq looming near, understanding threat perceptions among friends is key to maintaining any coalition designed to prevail over its enemies.” Increasing academic concerns are evident in a series of influential essays that have generated extensive debate: Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations Fukyama’s “The End of History,” and Kagan’s “Power and Weakness” are among the most prominent. In terms of public concerns, the recent Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund poll of 9,000 Europeans and Americans shows that citizens are more in step with each other than they are with their leadership. Such data on U.S., Canadian, European, and Asian elite threat perceptions over time are needed.

There is a growing perception of a widening gap between the United States and Europe in how security measures are viewed. Emil Kirchner noted that one of the major issues is, assuming a weakened NATO, what institutions would be left to facilitate a dialogue between Europe and the United States?

The workshop charted a strategy for identifying security threat perceptions in the G8 nations and China. The first step toward understanding the limits and promise of global security governance would be an elite survey that could reliably identify the range of national opinion about salient threats to national security, their probability, their geographical source, and the ‘best’ method for either preventing or responding to those threats. Based on that data, the dependent variable would be operationalized; viz., the variation in threat perception within this group of countries. The survey design would have to overcome the comparability problems presented, inter alia, by translation and different forms of domestic governance. It would provide the database for examining the range of differentiation in threat perceptions, the potential for cooperation, and the barriers to security governance. Finally, it would provide the foundation for crafting policy-relevant recommendations with respect to adopting national or multilateral responses to these threats.

In his concluding remarks Kirchner thanked the participants for their constructive contributions to the workshop. Drawing on the positive comments received for the envisaged G-8 extended to China project, Kirchner suggested two parallel, further developments. The first would be establishment of a draft questionnaire which would try to deal with the different security settings of Europe, Asia, and North America. This questionnaire would be discussed and possibly finalized in a follow-up workshop. Thanks to the offer of facilities by van Langenhove, the workshop will be held in Bruges in 2003–2004. As far as possible an updated literature and documentation (official government publications) survey would also be made available at this workshop. Kirchner and Sperling would, in consultation with others, prepare the details for this workshop. The second would be to explore in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere sources of research funds.. With respect to research on EU countries (enlarged), Kirchner noted that an application for a four-country study was to be shortly placed with the British ESRC, and that another for fourteen countries would be submitted to the European Union in the spring of 2003.

This project was sponsored by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and the Institute for International, Comparative and Area Studies (IICAS), UC San Diego. Conference organizers: William Chandler, UC San Diego; Emil Kirchner, Essex University; and James Sperling, University of Akron.